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CANON LAW IN
NEW DIMENSIONS
MIRIAM

THERESA ROONEY *

W

ITHIN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH there have been three
distinct movements during the present century which should not
be looked at separately, but rather must be read in context, in reviewing the relation of the Church and Law. These are: (1) the completion
of the Codex Juris Canonici, 1904-1917; (2) the continual emphasis
on justice in the Encyclical Letters of the Popes, especially since
1891; and (3) the juridical implications of the renewed reliance on
conscience in the work of Vatican Council II, which was brought
to a close December 8, 1965.
First of all, the completion of the Codex luris Canonici itself
marked an extraordinary innovation and a remarkable achievement,
completed, as it was, within thirteen years. It was an extraordinary
innovation, since no previous codification had ever been attempted in
the nineteen centuries of the Church's existence. It was a tremendous
achievement, since few other efforts at "the harmonization of
divergent canons,"-to use Gratian's phrase-had been made during
the millennium that had all but passed between the flowering of
juridical studies marked by the publication of the Decreturn Gratiani,
and the promulgation of the Codex. It signified a new movement
in the ancient Church to resurvey the latter's position in the modem
world from the standpoint of juridical structure, by undertaking to
separate rules still having vigor from those which had become
irrelevant to current needs. By concentrating on the law that is
instead of the law that was-on the present rather than the pastit reinforced the foundations, and made ready for the jurists
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who follow to build along new lines,
in the continuous effort to give more suitable shape to the law as it ought to be.
The second development, with juridical
implications of the very greatest importance, came with the Encyclical Letters,
and the Allocutions, of all the modern
Popes, from Leo XIII to Paul VI. These
direct attention repeatedly to the function
of justice in improving the conditions of
human life. Especially the four so-called
"social Encyclicals"-Rerum Novarum, on
the Reconstruction of the Social Order,
by Pope Leo, May 15, 1891; Quadragesimo Anno, issued Forty Years After, by
Pope Pius XI, May 15, 1931; Mater et
Magistra, or Mother and Teacher, by
Pope John XXIII, dated May 15, 1961;
and Pacem in Terris, Peace on Earth, by
Pope John XXIII, April 11, 1963have inaugurated and paralleled a
twentieth century revolution in thought
about the social conditions of human
living, which perhaps has not always
been acknowledged, nor even consciously
recognized, by those jurists who have
been challenged or encouraged to devote
their own efforts toward peace and justice through improvements in the law.
If the guidance provided by these four
Encyclicals be supplemented by that
given by Pope Saint Pius X in his Motu
Proprio of March 19, 1904, which established the Commission for the Codification of the Canon Law, under the presidency of Cardinal Gasparri; by Pope
Benedict XV, who promulgated the Codex
in 1917, to take effect one year later; by
Pope Pius XII, whose references to law
and justice were so frequent in all his
addresses that he will doubtless be re-
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ferred to in history as the Jurist-Pope; and
by Pope Paul VI, whose emphasis on
the dynamic in place of the static in
thought has especial significance for law,
the existence and direction of a new
flowering of juridical studies may be seen
as already well under way.
The third factor in the advance has
been the as yet unmeasurable contribution of the Ecumenical Council of 19611965. A total of sixteen documents have
been issued, among them a Declaration
devoted to liberty of conscience. Although
concerned primarily with religious belief,
the latter nevertheless has especial value
for law as well, for it, together with most
of the other Conciliar documents, puts
new emphasis on the importance of
knowledge in arriving at responsible decisions. The emphasis may seem strange
in the scientific age to which the Declaration is addressed, but the doctrine is not
novel. It was implicit in the canonization
in 1935 of the greatest lawyer in the
Anglo-American system, the Lord Chancellor Thomas More. And it had been
stated with particular clarity years earlier
by Thomas Aquinas when he said that
one cannot choose what one does not
know. This carefully thought out divergence of Saint Thomas from the earlier
view of Saint Anselm, who had inverted
the order by giving primacy to faith
over reason in the acquisition of knowledge, is even more striking in a pluralistic
society like the present than it was when
everyone in Europe confessed one creed,
or none. Acknowledging the function of
conscience in decision-making, as reaffirmed by the Council, is not at all the
same thing as saying that man is the
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measure of all things. Quite the contrary, all things, that is, the existent universe, as created by God, measure man
through the use he makes of its resources.
His judgments are subject to continual
revision through the verification of new
facts, and his determinations, which are
dependent for their validity upon his
judgments, are subject to appraisal at his
peril. By reasserting the importance of
conscience in the modern world, the
Council restores the all-but-forgotten function of judgment in law in a manner comparable to that in which the Encyclicals
have revived the all-but-repudiated function of justice.
With a Papal program which has done
so much to shift the juridical outlook
away from the past and toward the
present and future, it is puzzling to encounter occasional criticism directed at
a so-called "juridically organized church"
which is said to rely upon a rigid legalism to maintain its hierarchical structure.
Part of the difficulty is undoubtedly attributable to a perennial equivocation in the
use of legal terminology. This suggests
the need for communication with, and
clarification for, people who look at law
from different backgrounds. The difficulty
appears to lie deeper, however, than in
the use of words. Early training is also
involved. There are some who never
think of law except as a fearsome code
of prohibitions, which are imposed by
force, or threats of force. Although this
is classified as positivism, it is an essentially negative view, which eventually
looks outside the law for guidance, and
for justice. It prevailed to a large extent
throughout the nineteenth century, when

the vogue for codification was dominant,
but has come to be increasingly supplanted in the twentieth, as inadequate
for an age of dynamic development. Another group exists, fewer in numbers,
perhaps, as yet, who think of law constructively, as the foundation of the
living order which guides men toward
the minimum of socially acceptable conduct. These note that even the Mosaic
Code begins with affirmative directions,
and only later spells out prohibitions by
way of clarification. This group is often
troubled, moreover, by the narrow interpretations and rigid conceptualisms in
juridical thought, which, sometimes in
the very name of God, tend to usurp His
place as Creator of an on-moving universe. Looking upon the law as concerned
with a sequence of actualities rather than
assumptions, they find in the universe
challenges to comprehension far beyond
the reach of a goodly number of the manmade concepts which prevail. In the
vision of the Popes, both the positivists
and the dynamists, within the Church
and without, are urged to work together
in harmony, for needed stability as well
as change in law, in such a way as to
reflect the different rates of movement
manifest on the terrestrial sphere.
Before considering specifically whether
the current situation of the Canon Law
may be usefully subdivided into public
and private, it is necessary to turn attention toward the relations of law with
civil governments to see what trends are
Here the most striking
discernible.
phenomenon is the proliferation of new
states since World War I, and the replacement of hereditary monarchs as centers
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With the
of rule-making authority.
people in
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of
more
participation
various stages of governmental responsibility, the terminology of law itself
changes, and new categories inevitably
spring up.
Public law is the term that has generally been applied to laws concerning
the state, or to cases in which the state
is a party. All the rest have been included under the category of private law.
When the kings were centers of legal
authority, the identification of royal with
public interests was fairly simple. Following the growth of constitutional governments, the situation has become much
more complicated. First of all, constitutional law has itself become vast. A
comparable growth characterizes the new
field of administrative law. The latest
innovation is the distinctive and expanding subject of human rights law. All
these developments represent such an
interlocking of public and private interests
that the matter of classification becomes
as difficult as the situations in which
they arise.
If to these constitutional aspects there
be added: (1) the tendency of modern
governments to take ownership of shares
in what were once considered private
corporations, created under government
charter; or (2) the latest practice of
devising an interstate system of law, suitable for an agency like the European
Common Market; or (3) the expansion
of the rule-making authority of the United
Nations itself, and its specialized and cooperating agencies; the problem of separating public from private interests becomes formidable indeed, since many of
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the legal questions with which governmental institutions are concerned arise
through private claims. Unlike the days
when kings could not properly be cited
to appear on one side or another in
adversary litigation before courts conducted under their authority, and so, as
was facetiously said, "could do no
wrong"; or when successor states were
unsuable without their consent; today
sovereign immunity from suit is being
recognized more and more as an
anachronism. Private litigants can frequently present their cases on ostensibly
equal terms with government attorneys in
the new administrative tribunals, or before courts with comparable jurisdiction.
Even in the field of criminal law, formerly
a branch where the state's interest was
treated as predominant, the use of extraordinary writs, like habeas corpus, or
injunction, to test the validity of the proceedings in an ever-increasing number of
cases has tended to give public interests
the appearance of privacy. Less obvious,
perhaps, but no less effective in shifting
categories in the opposite direction, is the
growing practice of state intervention,
through briefs amicus curiae, in litigation
ostensibly involving only private parties,
in order to protect the public interest in
later cases which could be affected unfavorably by the establishment of a
precedent in the instant situation without
having had the right to be heard. Under
such developing practices as these, the
attempt to divide cases neatly as either
public or private would seem not only
unnecessarily difficult, but also undesirable
on that account, at the present time.
Many of the cases which raise the
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issue of classification in both secular and
canon law systems are considered in
modern canonical treatises under the
heading of public ecclesiastical law. Their
subject-matter is that which historically
has been covered by the concordats, and
includes marriage law, education, public
worship, church property, and the unique
dignity accorded ecclesiastical persons.
Although private rights are basic in these
fields, the public interest is so extensive
also that the duty as well as the right of
governments to be heard has been
acknowledged
with
impressive legal
formalities by the Church. History is an
important prerequisite to the understanding of the customary provisions.
In
countries where the monarchy officially
retained the Catholic faith, tradition
guaranteed full recognition and often exclusive privileges under state law. In
countries where the monarchy and some
of the people came to profess religious
beliefs other than Catholic, the technique
of treaty-making was adopted from international law practice, and the agreements
negotiated were called concordats, indicating their distinctive character. In the
newer countries without hereditary monarchies, in which the people often manifest religious beliefs even more various
than the political views represented in
their governments, the concordat technique
presents complications from the juridical
standpoint. Undoubtedly the high-point
in public ecclesiastical law was reached
in the unique Lateran Treaty, between
Pope Pius XI and the Government of
Italy, signed February 11, 1929, which
is much more comprehensive in content
than the usual concordat, and constitutes

an extraordinary diplomatic achievement
on both sides.
With many modern governments, no
attempt to formalize a modus vivendi has
been attempted.
This does not mean
that Church interests, or the rights of
individual Catholics, have been left entirely unprotected.
On the contrary,
situations, which under different circumstances might have given rise to grave
controversy, may have been resolved
more or less informally with such fairness
manifested on both sides when they arose,
that a formalization of the procedure
would appear inadvisable because of the
possibility of multiplying technical problems without adding any necessary factor
to their solution. The fact is that the
changes that have taken place between
nineteenth
century
conditions
and
twentieth, both with respect to juridical
thinking within the Church and to the
organization of juridical responsibilities
within the new governments, have been
so far-reaching, that the very term of
public ecclesiastical law begins to appear
dated.
To take note of a transition under way
is not to deny the continuing existence of
matters customarily handled in this field,
nor to minimize their importance. Rather
it is in recognition of their expansion in
number and depth that the search for a
broader base appears necessary. Today
not only monarchies, or successors to
monarchies, in Europe may be involved,
as was the case once upon a time, but
there are well over a hundred states, not
in Europe alone, but throughout the
world, within whose territories the Church
is established.
In any of them, legal
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questions, extending all the way from a
children's religious procession in the
streets, or a traffic ticket to a clergyman,
to the right of succession to church
property of a newly appointed bishop, can
arise. Judicial determinations may have
to be reached through the familiar procedures of the classical Roman tradition,
or in any of the legal systems in force
anywhere. Possibly an issue could even
be carried to the International Court of
Justice, or the European Court of Human
Rights. Nor is it essential that either
state or church be an actual party litigant.
Quite possibly a situation involving the
right of a private person could be so
affected with a religious interest of broad
public concern that either state or church
might consider it advisable to record that
interest formally as amicus curiae. Indeed
some of the most important decisions of
the United States Supreme Court forbidding coercion by the state in matters
involving religious belief have been raised
by individuals, some being members of
comparatively small sects, or of none,
but their constitutional effect has extended
far beyond the parties immediately involved.
From what has been said so far the
question of whether the classification of
public and private law is suitable for
canon law has focused attention on some
of the most significant problems confronted by contemporary jurists. Development of new aspects of corporation
law, administrative law, and human
rights law, are of special importance in
disclosing the shift from private to public
on one side, and from public to private
on the other, with undercurrents of public
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interest in cases still denominated private, and of private cases which set
precedents of public concern. Changes
in the status of persons acting as heads
of state moreover, have modified the
rules regarding immunity from suit,
thereby affecting the function of the state
as party litigant. Although not mentioned hitherto, because more obvious,
another far-reaching change is the gradual
abandonment of the use of state force
to coerce in matters of religious belief.
Notwithstanding the survivals still to be
found on this point in important areas,
there has been an unmistakable trend
which brings liberty of conscience forward
in a juridically significant way.
Paralleling, and to a large extent
initiating, the juridical advance, have
been the continual efforts of the Popes
to clear away obsolete practices and
inadequate concepts. The concentration
of the Codex on the law that is; the
recommendation of the Encyclicals that
the law should be beforehand and prevent- troubles, especially through denial
of justice, from arising; and the renewed
emphasis on personal responsibility in
arriving at judgments and making decisions, points up a dynamic approach
attuned to the manifold movements disclosed by contemporary science in time
and space.
With the changes taking place in the
function of the state, and the changes
adopted in the attitude of the Church,
the juridical formulas that have hitherto
been developed in the relationship between the two can hardly remain unchanged.
The fact is that instead of
disappearing along with hereditary rulers
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and state churches, the church-state problems have shifted in interest from institutions to persons. This has increased the
cases in breadth and depth enormously.
It is not too much to say that today the
church-state situation in law presents
about the most difficult hurdle that confronts the legal mind. From the standpoint of civilization, its potential scope is
second to none. Here the past is of much
less significance than the prospect.
The revolution in the American colonies
-not against law, but for law, as opposed
to tyranny-which was given legal expression in 1789, in the first written constitution ever devised, was a tremendous
leap forward toward political freedom.
A century later it began to become
obvious that political freedom amounted
to little more than a paper achievement
if it was not also accompanied by
economic freedom. As spelled out in the
direct language of Mr. Justice Louis
Brandeis, this meant nothing more nor
less than that the test of character is met
in the spending of the dollar. Through
the revolution for economic freedom
which is under way at present there has
been a shift in interest from producers
to consumers in coordinating supply with
demand in the market. This has called
forth new thinking on the old problem
of just price. Further evidence comes
from the explosion in property-holding,
which finds increasingly wide distribution
of shares in corporate industrial investment. The expanded opportunities for
utilizing savings in investment have tended
to develop a wide awareness of the responsibilities of management. The invention of consumer financing devices which

encourage saving in advance in order to
procure a desired object on credit, instead
of the old idea of merely accumulating
unproductive surplus funds, has further
emphasized the importance of consumption in the economy, and the irrelevance
of the' historical concept of usury to
present conditions. The manifestation of
personal values by the use to which
income is put provides one kind of
measure for the degree of civilization
achieved.
Another kind of measure is found in
turning from material wants to the needs
of the spirit. In this area, when religion
was too closely identified with the political
fortunes of heads of state, and when
governmental force was brought to bear
coercively in matters of public worship,
there was little scope for freedom of
conscience.
Much suffering in spirit,
even if not always in body, has been
recorded.
Rebellion has taken many
forms, but none perhaps more eloquent
than that marked by emigration to areas
where compulsion in affairs of the spirit
is less frequent. The ancient habits inculcated by the maintenance of a state
church have not been easy to overcome,
but once it was seen that the church often
suffered more than the state when the
political revolution arrived, the urgent
need for a more human arrangement
speeded up the movement for greater
religious freedom. Liberty in matters of
conscience is still so new that churchstate cases in law must be adjudicated
step by cautious step. The fact that
cases involving religious beliefs are
multiplying rather than decreasing suggests that concern over things of the
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spirit is very much alive, however, even
in an era where economic interests appear
predominant.
Ultimately the changing relations between church and state are juridical in
nature, but they can hardly remain unaffected by the economic revolution that
conditions legal decisions in other areas.
The basic problem is financial support.
As a matter of fact, the church has never
been entirely free from governmental
regulation, precisely because of its dependence upon adequate economic support, or at least cooperation, for its
existence.
In the days of feudalism,
church activities had to rely on the goodwill of the landlords. To secure a certain amount of freedom of action, independent ownership became necessary and
has continued to be so. In an economy
where landholding has been increasingly
subordinated to industrial activity as a
source of income, however, the support
of church activities has not received adequate consideration from the economists
as yet. Voluntary contributions from
the many have replaced the benefactions
of the royal and feudal lords. They
have been sufficiently large to indicate
the very great concern of the people in
things of the spirit. But there have been
no widespread provisions made by most
modern states to take official action with
respect to the support of spiritual activities. The subject has been so emotionally
charged that modern democracies either
tend to ignore it completely, or to eliminate governmental aid gradually in any
form, direct or indirect. The issue is
becoming crucial, especially regarding the
use of tax monies in the educational field
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in such a way as to protect freedom of
religious belief. It promises to be no less
so with respect to the support of
churches, hospitals, social agencies, and
other traditional church activities in the
future unless met squarely by legal provisions that take into account the interdependent relations of economic freedom
to political freedom and to freedom of
conscience.
More properly a legislative rather than
a judicial matter, the problem of financial
support for the various church activities
is so far-reaching for all the people that
settlement of individual cases by court decisions is properly not private law but
public in the fullest sense.
Not one
religion is affected, but all. Not one country is concerned, but all of the growing
number of constitutional democracies.
The problem goes far beyond the objection to state monopoly of education. It
involves the right to speak, preach, teach,
assemble, and worship freely, without discrimination, which are among the basic
human rights that the modern state is
expected to guarantee. This situation has
changed so completely from the days of
national churches, or of concordats, that
nothing less than a secret ballot from all
the people, in each nation, indicating their
religious preference, or none, in the support of religious activities with the help
of state funds, will meet the present
situation.
The matter can no longer be confined
within the limits of public ecclesiastical
law, and considered of interest only to
specially trained canonists. Judges and
officials in governments everywhere are
confronted with the problem. It is an
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entirely new area of constitutional law,
no less important than the new fields of
administrative law, corporation law, labor
law, planning law (including zoning
aspects), and human rights law. The
specialists in church-state law in the future
will require as much competence in general law practice, not only in the civil
law system traditional in Europe, but also
in the common law of the Anglo-American system, as the practitioners in
property, or corporation law, must have
in order to be successful at the present
time. The shift from a legal concern for
the preservation of established institutions,
or status quo, toward the view of law as
service for human beings in their basic
needs, physical and spiritual, makes
serious demands upon professional skills.
In accord with the growing recognition
that the state exists for the person-not
the other way around-and that the
church exists to serve the person, it must
be increasingly acknowledged that the
law has no greater purpose than to aid
and protect human beings in their social
life. In the jurisprudence of the futureas distinct from that of the past-instead of dividing law into public and
private, it is more likely that legal provisions of all systems will coalesce on
guidance toward the fuller development
of personality in each individual, and that
a professional mastery of comparative
law will be required, to break down discriminatory barriers, and to build up
facilities and institutions that will help to
make life more fully human. The qualifications of all lawyers working in a field
like church-state law will need to be
adequate for professional practice in
tribunals of the highest rank everywhere

in the world.
Instead of the classification of law
into public and private, with special
reference to canon law, it might be
preferable to reconsider the more ancient
classification of the Roman Law, into
persons, things, procedure, crimes and
penalties.
The Roman categories had
the merit of putting first things first, by
giving to persons over property in considering rights and duties. The fundamental issue in church-state cases is no
longer, if it ever was, a matter of protecting vested interests.
The new jurisprudence has moved a long way from
property preferences in its approach to
social justice. What is at stake is the
guidance of human beings in making
effective choices between such alternatives as may be presented. A legal
order which looks backward for its
justifications to times when laboring
people were looked upon as a commodity,
and misses the significance of the world
movement toward protection of human
rights in the current revolution of rising
expectations, is unlikely to function with
honor much longer, or even to be consulted. The law of the future must be
certain to put first things first, and this
necessarily includes things of the spirit.
The canon law is in a unique position
at present for unusual development along
lines of social justice.
Through the
codification, the law that is was separated
from the law that was. Fifty years of
analysis and experience with the operation
of the Codex have shown where gaps
might be filled or improvements introduced. A commission on revision has
already been appointed.
The modem
criterion of justice which has been urged
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by the social doctrine of the Encyclicals
calls for increasing cooperation with the
states in improving the human condition.
Recognition of the special function of the
lawyers in making justice effective in
collaboration with economists, political
scientists, and government, corporation,
and labor officials, among others, is suggested in all of these, but especially in
the juridically oriented addresses of Pope
Pius XII, and in the call for dynamic, as
contrasted with static, action, by Pope
Paul VI.
The Encyclical, Pacem in
Terris, of Pope John XXIII, was broadly
visioned to embrace juridical improvement on the world scale. The way is
opened, not so much for a new code,
with rigidities written in, but for a new
emphasis in reaching decisions case by
case. Not institutions or practices, however long established, but persons, with
their needs and responsibilities, must
now be put uppermost. With the recent
change from the cautious and protective
attitude of conservation and preservation
to an outlook embracing all the people
of God on the march toward the second
coming of Christ, which characterized the
Council, all the documents issued, but
especially the Declaration on Freedom of
Conscience, point the way to a new
juridical flowering at the very moment
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when the world is becoming more and
more confused about rights and obligations under law.
With the shift in emphasis toward persons and their place in the law, the new
jurisprudence calls for a differently
oriented
professional
education
for
lawyers. Civilians and canonists alike,
who have been trained to look backward
for precedents in the interest of fairness,
will have to develop fresh outlooks and
changed techniques. Without losing the
invaluable skills of analysis, exactness,
and relevance, they will have to begin to
work much more closely with economists,
and psychologists, and extend their vision
beyond local law, to the world view.
More, rather than less, knowledge of
history will be needed in order to understand relationships and the paths that
transition takes. Most of all, a revised
set of values will have to be worked into
law, reviving the enduring hopes of the
human spirit which alone give purpose
to juridical effort. With so much challenge made manifest, there will surely be
no shortage of generous and enthusiastic
aspirants for leadership in the legal profession, who will be able to earn and
claim the high regard of the people, all
of whom rely upon the law for guarantees
of justice and freedom.

